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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH APEX MINING COM-
PANY-and 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY and 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
of UTAH and CLARENCE PETER-
SEN, 
Defendoots. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE NO. 
7282 
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, are plaintiffs') 
On May 20, 1931, applicant Clarence Petersen was 
injured in the course of employment at the Utah-Apex 
Mining Company at Bingham Canyon, Utah, and sus-
tained, ·among other injuries, a fractured left knee. The 
Mining Company at the time of accident carried work-
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men's compensation insurance with the United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company, and reported the acci-
dent to the Industrial Commission of Utah on May 29, 
1931. On December 8, 1933, Clarence Peters-en appeared 
before a Medical Advisory Committee at the Industrial 
Commission offices at the State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (R.4). The testimony at that time indicated 
permanent partial disability of fifty per cent as the 
result of injuries sustained in the accident. 
Thereafter, on December 19, 1933, a settlement 
agreement was executed between Petersen and the Min-
ing and Insurance co~panies in full compromise of nll 
payments due and to become due for said injuries (R. 
51, plaintiffs' exhibit 1). Petersen received from the 
insurance com;pany on or before December 19, 1933, a 
total of $5,197.36, which sum included compensation pay-
ments of $3,076.48 and medical, hospital, nursing, and 
transportation payments of $2,120.88 (R. 13). 
On July 17, 1948, more than 14 years after the date 
of the settlement -agreement and completion of pay-
ments thereunder and more than 16 years after the ac-
cident, Petersen for the first time filed an application 
for compensa~tion resulting from the injury of May 20, 
1931. The insurance company declined liability (R. 19), 
and on August 25, 1948, a hearing on this application 
was conducted by the Industrial Commission. There-
after, on November 8, 1948, the Commission filed its 
decision in the case, the findings and order ( R. 28) 
reading as follows: 
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FINDINGS 
'' ..._-\..fter hearing the testimony in the case and re-
viewing the same as set forth in the transcript and other 
documentary evidence receiYed and made a part of the 
record, the Commission finds that the applicant became 
temporarily disabled on December 6, 1947, because of 
a moderate osteomyelitis at the old point of fusion of the 
knee joint; that this disability was a result of the injury 
to the applicant's left knee on May 20, 1931; that the 
applicant is therefore entitled to the benefits under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, i.e. payment for tem-
porary total compensation from December ·6, 1947 to 
June 13, 1948; that his permanent partial ·disability fol-
lowing his release from the hospital and treatment by 
the doctor was 50% loss of bodily function which was 
not in excess of the disability rated following the In-
jury on May 20, 1931. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defend-
ants pay for all hospital and medical expense incurred 
in the recent recurrence of the effects of the old injury 
of May 20, 1931, ·and compensation as follows: 
27 weeks at $13.41 - 12-6-47 to 6-13-48- $362.07'' 
Mr. Earl J. Groth appeared for the defendants at 
the hearing on August 25, 1948, and at the outset of the 
proceedings and prior to the introduction of evidence, 
objected to the hearing on the ground that the Commis-
sion was without jurisdiction because· of the statute of 
limitations, and further because the settlement agree-
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ment precluded further claim. The details of the ob-
jections are set forth at pages 32 to 34 of the record. 
Apparently Petersen re'turned to work for the Min-
ing Company after the settlement in 1933, and contin-
ued to work for that company until April of 1938, al-
though whether this employment ceased because of dis-
charge or the closing of the Utah-Apex Mining Company 
opera,tions is not clear from the record (R. 40) ; neither 
is it clear as to just what he did during the years from 
1938 to 1945, although he apparently left Bingham (R. 
45). In 1945, he did some leasing work (R. 37), and 
between that year and December, 1947, he operated a 
card room at Eureka (R. 40). On December 6, 1947, 
Petersen entered a hospital at Bingham, Utah, for fur-
ther tre~atment to the · left knee and leg, and was dis-
charged on June 13, 1948 (R. 47). 
The injuries sustained in the accident of May 20, 
1931, were of a serious nature and resulted in a per-
manent partial disability of fifty per cent. During all 
of the years from 1933 to 1947, when he reentered the 
hospital, he had had constant trouble with his knee 
which bothered him all the time (R. 35), and had been 
operated on in a General Hospital two different times 
(R. 40) for this knee injury. 
Dr. Paul ·S. Richards of Bingham, Utah, was the 
attending physician at the time of the original injury, 
and during the period between the time Petersen re-
turned to work after the accident and the year 1938, 
treated Petersen's knee every month (R. 44). Dr. 
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Richards did not again see applicant until September, 
1947, when the leg was infected under the area of the 
old operations ·at time of injury, which latter infection 
the Doctor attributed to the old injury (R. 43). The 
Doctor also testified that upon discharge from the hos-
pital on June 27, 1948, Petersen's condition was about 
the same as that of the time of discharge immediately 
after the accident, with the same amount of disability 
(R. 46). 
In confirmation of the file of the Industrial Com-
mission, Petersen testified that the application of July 
17, 1948, was the only application he had ever made 
with the Industrial Commission for compensation (R. 
40). 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Plaintiffs rely up-on the following errors : 
Error No.1 
That the Industrial Commission of Utah erred in 
awarding compensation and hospital and medical ex-
pense, since claim was not made by ·defendant within 
three years from date of accident or date of last pay-
ment of compensation, and the claim therefore was 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
Error No.2 
That the Industrial Commission of Utah erred in 
awarding compensation for 27 weeks at $13.41 per week 
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from December 6, 194 7, to June 13, 1948, since all tem-
porary total disability must arise within six years of 
the date of injury and this award was therefore barred 
by statute of limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
Error No.1 
For the convenience of the court, section 42-1-92, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, which is believed to be one 
of the applicable statutes of limitations of Title 42, 
is set forth : 
''When an employee claiming to have suffered 
an injury in the service of his employer fails to 
give notice to his employer of the time and place 
where the accident and injury occured, and of the 
nature of the same, within forty-eight hours, when 
possible, or fails to report for medical treatment 
within said time, the compensation provided for 
herein shall be reduced fifteen per cent; provided, 
that knowledge of such injury obtained from any 
source on the part of such employer, his managing 
agent, superintendent, foreman or other person in 
authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the 
injured sufficient to afford an opportunity to the 
employer to make an investigation into the facts 
and to provide medical treatment shall be equi-
valent to such notice; and no defect or inaccuracy 
therein shall subject the claimant to such reduc-
tion, if there was no intention to mislead or pre-
judice the employer in making his defense, and 
the employer was not, in fact, so misled or pre-
judiced thereby. If no notice of the accident and 
injury is given to the employer within one year 
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7 
from the date of the nrrident, the right to com-
pensation shall be "'"holly barred. If no claim for 
compensn tion is filed "\Yi th the Industrial Commis-
sion "\Yithin three years from the da'te of the acci-
dent or the date of the last payment of compensa-
tion, the right to compensation shall he wholly 
barred''. 
The facts of the instant case are free from conflict. 
Clarence Petersen sustained an injury in the course of 
employment on May 20, 1931, and pursuant to settle-
ment agreement the last compensation was paid on De-
cember 19, 1933. Presumably the matter was closed, 
until July 17, 1948, at which time and for the first time, 
an application for compensation was filed by Petersen, 
after a lapse of more than fourteen years. 
It will be noted that the statute above quoted pro-
vides that a claim for compensation must be filed within 
three years from the date of the accident or the date .of 
the last payment of compensation. The statute seems 
clear and unambiguous, and the right to compensation 
under the facts of the case had long since expired, by 
July 17, 1948. 
A point of inquiry arises relative to the time at 
which Petersen became aware of a disability as a result 
of the accident. The evidence clearly establishes that 
he was not only aware of it from the time .of the injury 
in 1931, but continued to be fully cognizant of his diffi-
culties at all times until he entered the hospital in De-
cember of 194 7. It will be noted that the settlement 
agreement itself recognized a dis a hili ty ·of fifty percent 
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in 1933. Between that time and the year 1938, Petersen 
consulted Dr. Paul Richards monthly for the same in-
jury -and complications for which compensation is now 
asked. After the year 1938, he testified that he was 
hospitalized at least once in addition to the initial hos-
pitalization. In addition to the~e undis1puted facts, 
Petersen also stated that during all of the period of 
time between 1933 ·and entering the hospital in Decem-
ber of 1947, his knee was constantly bothering him and 
in a condition which interfered with his employment. 
This case is clearly one where the employee at all times 
knew that he had an injury and appreciated the effect 
of that injury on his employment. It is not a case where 
the injured employee suddenly discovers that an injury 
has resulted from an accident, some years after the date 
of the accident. 
The case of Hallstrom v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 96 Utah 85, 83 P. 2d 730 (1938) is very similar 
factually. In that case, Plaintiff Hallstrom was em-
ployed as a deputy warden by the State Fish and Game 
Department, and injured his .ankle on April 20, 1931, 
while cleaning some ponds. He consulted Dr. T. A. 
Dannenburg ·and received treatment, although nothing 
was said of any pain or injury to the left hip. Hall-
strom continued his work, and was paid a regular salary, 
with the result that the compensation awarded was 
turned over to the Fish & Game Department, and the 
Doctor bill paid by the State Insur-ance Fund. 
Hallstrom, however, noticed some pain in his left 
hip a month or so after the accident, which continued 
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thereafter and also the leg seemed to get shorter. A 
year later, he obtained a special shoe for the left foot 
because of this shortening. Nothing 'vas done ·about the 
continued hip pains until X rays "\Yere taken in Febru-
ary, 1938, which showed a degeneration in the left hip. 
Compensation was denied, and the court stated at page 
730: 
''The first question to be determined is 
whether plaintiff's application for compensation 
"~as filed within the statutory iJleriod. · Plaintiff 
asserts that the statute did not commence to run 
until he discovered that he might be entitled to 
compensation for the injury to his hip. This dis-
covery was made shortly before the X-ray pictures 
were taken. Plaintiff claims that as long as he was 
unaware that he might he entitled to compensa-
tion the statute did not run. He relies on the re-
·cent decision of this court in Salt Lake City v. 
Industrial Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P. 2d 657 
to support his argument. The decision in that 
case held that the statute did not begin to run 
until there was a disability. The disability or 
compensable injury as it is sometimes called, 
gives rise to a duty to pay compensation if the 
disabled person is entitled to comp·ensation at 
all. It is not necessary in this case to determine 
at what stage of the disability the statute would 
commence inasmuch as the evidence is conclusive 
that the disability complained of was apparent 
more than three years before application for com-
pensation was made. According to plaintiff's own 
testimony be became aware of pain in his left hip 
soon after the accident. He testified that this 
pain continued and his left leg commenced to get 
shorter until it became necessary to have a special 
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shoe made for his left foot. This occurred back 
in 1932, the application was not made for com-
rpensa·tion until March, 1938. The mere fact that 
an applicant does not deduce from an ·apparent 
physical infirmity the conclusion that it came 
from a former accident occurring in industry 
does not prevent the statute from running." 
The case in effect held that the statute begins to 
run from the date the dis·ability is known to the em-
ployee~ While this decision was in 1938, and the statute 
quoted above was amended in 1939 by the addition of 
the last sentence thereof, the same reasoning as to the 
commencement of the right to claim compensation has 
been followed in subsequent cases. See Salt Lake City 
v. Industrial 1Commission, 104 Utah 436, 140 P. 2d 644 
( 1943), although the facts are distinctly different from 
those of the instant case. 
See also Edwards v. Industrial Commission, 189 P. 
2d 124 (Utah, 1948). 
Error No.2 
There is another as1pect of the time limitation which 
deserves consideration. Section 42-1-61 Revised S-tat-
utes of Utah, 1933 (which so far as we are here con-
cerned is unchanged to the present time, although 
amendments have been m·ade in some details) reads as 
follows: 
"In case of temporary disability, the em-
ployee shall receive 60 per cent of his average 
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weekly wages so long as such disabili·ty is total; 
not to exceed a maximum of $16 per week, and 
not less than a minim tun of $7 per week; pro-
vided, that "\Yhere the vvage earned at the time 
of injury is less than $7 per week, the amount of 
wages earned shall be the amount of compensa-
tion to be paid. In no case sha.ll su.ch compensa-
tion co1l.t-inue for rnore than six years from the 
date of the infury or exceed $5,000." 
The Hallstrom case, supra, clearly indicates that 
the right to compensation commences at the time the 
effect of the accident is so apparent as to indicate an 
injury which is compensable. As has been previously 
pointed out in detail, Clarence Petersen clearly pos-
sessed such knowledge during the early part .of the 
1930's, and the injury within the meaning of the Com-
pensation Act occurred at that time. The decision of 
the Industrial Commission rendered N O"£:ember 8, 1948, 
seems clearly to attempt to provide for compensation 
for temporary disability more than six years from the 
date of the injury. 
It will be noted that this statute above is a limita-
tion as to the extent, both as to time and amount, on 
compensation payment. It limits compensation to a six 
year period following the injury, .or to the sum of $5,000 
in the event payments during the six years happened 
to make an award in excess of that sum. It does not, 
however, permit payments for temporary disability at 
a time some fourteen years after the injury as the Com-
mission has attempted to do in the instant case. 
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We are unable to find a Utah case interpreting this 
statute from the standpoint ·of the problem here in-
volved, and have likewise been unable to locate a case 
from another jurisdiction interpreting a similar statute. 
For this reason, we are unable to refer the court to 
previous authority. The statute, however, seems so 
clear that citation of authority is, in any event, unnec-
essary. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the award of 
the Industrial Commission cannot be -sustained, and that 
the same should be annulled and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Earl Groth and Robert Spooner 
Skeen, Thurman and Worsley 
Attorneys for PZaintiffs. 
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